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CORRESPONDENCE 
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation: 
Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond 
Walter Hellerstein * 
Few questions in recent years have spawned as much controversy 
and as little academic interest as the scope of commerce clause re-
straints on state tax power. The Supreme Court has handed down an 
extraordinary number of significant decisions addressed to the limita-
tions the commerce clause imposes on state taxation. I Yet these deci-
sions have barely caught the eye of the nation's leading law reviews2 or 
constitutional scholars. 3 Even those observers who have recognized 
the Court's renaissance of interest in the dormant commerce clause 
have largely confined their attention to state regulation, as distin-
guished from state taxation, of interstate commerce.4 If there is an 
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B. 1967, Harvard University; J.D. 1970, Uni-
versity of Chicago. - Ed. 
I. Over the past decade, the Court has averaged better than a decision a year addressed in 
whole or in part to commerce clause restraints on state taxation. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. 
Florida Dept. of Revenue, 106-S. Ct. 2369 (1986); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 
(1984); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 
U.S. 388 (1984); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Com· 
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 
(1981); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 
U.S. 434 (1979); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Department of Revenue v. 
Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); United States Steel Corp. v. Multi-
state Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 
(1977); National Geographic Socy. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Bos-
ton Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The Court will have rendered two 
more such decisions by the time these comments see the light of day. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash-
ington Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987); American Trucking Assns. v. Scheiner, 107 S. 
Ct. 2829 (1987). 
2. Other than a few case notes in the Harvard Law Review's annual survey of Supreme Court 
opinions, and my own efforts to explicate the Court's commerce clause decisions, see, e.g., Heller· 
stein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, 
and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REv. 113, 130-39, 151-53 (1980); Hellerstein, State Taxation and 
the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudication?, 75 MICH. 
L. REv. 1426, 1441-46 (1977), one will search in vain in the leading law reviews for sustained 
discussions of the Court's dormant commerce clause opinions addressed to state taxation. 
3. One happy exception is Lockhart, A Revolution in State Taxation of Commerce?, 65 
MINN. L. REV. 1025 (1981). 
4. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 426 n.2 
(1982); Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much - An Examination of Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 49 n.8 (1981); Smith, State Discriminations Against 
Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1203 (1986); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Com-
758 
February 1987] Correspondence 759 
explanation for this puzzling neglect of state taxation, it may lie in the 
remark of Gerald Gunther - who unceremoniously dropped the sub-
ject from his casebook - that "pursuit of the intricacies of state taxa-
tion . . . would require more time and space than the undertaking 
warrants."5 
Given the current turn in academic fashion, Donald Regan's char-
acteristically thoughtful examination of the Court's commerce clause 
jurisprudence in The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making 
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause 6 assumes an added dimension 
because it discusses matters involving state taxation of interstate com-
merce. Although state taxation is not the principal focus of Regan's 
analysis, his thoughts concerning the Court's state tax decisions raise 
questions that merit further comment for two reasons: first, they shed 
additional light on Regan's central thesis; second, they are worthy of 
consideration in their own right. 
I 
Donald Regan's central thesis is that the Supreme Court should be 
and has been exclusively concerned with purposeful economic protec-
tionism in adjudicating commerce clause challenges to state regulation 
of interstate commerce involving movement of goods. In nearly two 
hundred pages of elaborately reasoned (if somewhat breezily articu-
lated) argument, Regan seeks to demonstrate that judicial invalidation 
of state legislation in these cases is theoretically justified only when the 
legislation was adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive 
position of in-state economic actors over their out-of-state competi-
tors; that the Court's decisions are consistent with this theory; and 
that talk of "balancing" in the Court's opinions, which conventional 
wisdom takes seriously, amounts to little more than rhetorical window 
dressing. 
Regan acknowledges that some of the Court's commerce clause 
decisions do not fit into this mold. In particular, he points to state 
regulation of interstate transportation and state taxation of interstate 
commerce as "areas in which the Court appears to do more under the 
dormant commerce clause than merely suppress state protectionism."7 
With regard to state taxation, Regan observes that neither the Court's 
merce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125. But see Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a 
Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 
31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985). 
5. G. GUNTHER, CONSfITUTIONAL LAW 332-33 (11th ed. 1985). 
6. 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). 
7. Id. at 1182. 
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insistence under the commerce clause that taxes be fairly apportioned8 
nor its disapproval of flat-rate taxes9 can be explained on the basis of 
the anti-protectionism principle. These cases reflect an additional 
principle that businesses operating in more than one state should not 
be subjected to heavier tax burdens than businesses operating in a sin-
gle state ''just because they operate in more than one state."10 
The Court's decisions in the state tax field, no less than its deci-
sions in other areas of commerce clause adjudication, reveal a vigilant 
concern with purposeful economic protectionism. 11 But these deci-
sions, as Regan recognizes, have plainly gone further: 
The vice characteristic of those [taxes] which have been held invalid is 
that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be 
capable, in point of substance, of being imposed or added to with equal 
right by every state which the commerce touches, merely because inter-
state commerce is being done, so that without the protection of the com-
merce clause it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local 
commerce. 12 
More recently, the Court has framed this requirement as one of" 'in-
ternal consistency - that is the [tax] must be such that, if applied by 
every jurisdiction,' there would be no impermissible interference with 
free trade." 13 
Although Regan makes no pretense of comprehensively analyzing 
the Court's state tax decisions, his treatment of them raises the ques-
tion whether the two concerns he has identified - purposeful eco-
nomic protectionism and cumulative tax burdens - can explain their 
results. The Court's decisions over the past decade invalidating state 
taxes on commerce clause grounds14 suggest an affirmative answer. In 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 15 the Court struck down a tax exemp-
tion for locally produced alcoholic beverages where the legislature's 
avowed purpose was to favor local over out-of-state goods. 16 In West-
8. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317 (1968). 
9. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). 
10. Regan, supra note 6, at 1186. 
11. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 
v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); Boston Stock Exch. v. 
State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
12. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938) (citations 
omitted). 
13. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (quoting Container Corp. of America 
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983)) (bracketed word in original). 
14. See cases cited in note 11 supra. The only other decision invalidating a levy on commerce 
clause grounds during the past decade was Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 
434 (1979), a decision that turned on considerations peculiar to state taxation of foreign com-
merce, with which Regan is not concerned. See Regan, supra note 6, at 1177 n.156. 
15. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
16. The Court did observe, however, that "[a] finding that state legislation constitutes 'eco-
February 1987] Correspondence 761 
inghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 17 the Court struck down an income 
tax credit explicitly designed by the legislature to favor in-state over 
out-of-state activity. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 18 the Court struck 
down a taxing scheme that was deliberately designed to shield local 
economic activity from the impact of the exaction. In Boston Stock 
Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 19 the Court struck down a levy 
specifically intended to improve the competitive position of local vis-a-
vis out-of-state stock exchanges. In Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 20 the 
Court struck down a tax that subjected interstate business to the risk 
of cumulative tax burdens not borne by local commerce.21 
The Court's decisions over the past decade sustaining state taxes 
over commerce clause objections22 likewise support the hypothesis 
that the Court views its essential responsibility as safeguarding taxpay-
ers from purposeful economic protectionism and cumulative tax bur-
dens. These decisions, however, do raise questions regarding the 
precise nature of its commitment to those goals. For example, the 
Court (like Regan) found no purposeful discrimination in Common-
nomic protectionism' may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose or discrimina-
tory effect." 468 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
17. 466 U.S. 388 (1984). 
18. 451 U.S. 725 (1981). 
19. 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
20. 467 U.S. 638 (1984). 
21. Although Armco involved a tax that the Court also characterized as discriminatory, 467 
U.S. at 639, 644, it is questionable whether the discrimination was "purposeful economic protec-
tionism," as Regan has employed that phrase. The allegedly discriminatory provision at issue in 
Armco was part of West Virginia's broad-based Business and Occupation Tax, imposed on the 
privilege of engaging in business in the state and measured by the gross receipts from the busi-
ness. The levy embraced most business activity in the state, including manufacturing, selling, 
contracting, banking, public utility and other services, and natural resource production. In gen-
eral, if a taxpayer were engaged in two different business activities, it would pay a tax for the 
privilege of engaging in each activity upon the specified measure and rate for that activity. There 
was an exception to this general pattern, however, with respect to enterprises engaged in both 
manufacturing and wholesaling in the state. Although such an enterprise would in principle be 
subject to both the manufacturing and the wholesaling tax, the statute provided that any person 
exercising the taxable privilege of manufacturing was not required to pay the tax otherwise im-
posed on those exercising the taxable privilege of wholesaling. The legislative purpose underly-
ing this exemption was clearly to avoid duplicative taxation of taxpayers engaged in closely 
related activities in the state. Nevertheless, it facially discriminated against the out-of-state man-
ufacturer who made wholesale sales in West Virginia: such a manufacturer would pay a whole-
saling tax to West Virginia from which the local manufacturer-wholesaler would be exempt 
(because it had paid a manufacturing tax). Despite the fact that the facial discrimination did not 
result in actual discrimination because the manufacturing tax paid by the local manufacturer-
wholesaler was greater than the wholesaling tax paid by the out-of-state manufacturer-whole-
saler, the Court pointed out that if other states were to impose taxes similar to West Virginia's, 
interstate manufacturer-wholesalers would suffer because they "will pay both a manufacturing 
tax [to the state of manufacture] and a wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Virginia will 
pay only the manufacturing tax." 467 U.S. at 644. 
22. See cases cited in note 1 supra, other than the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph 
and Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441U.S.434 (1979), discussed in note 14supra. 
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wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 23 where Montana imposed a thirty per-
cent severance tax on coal, virtually all of which was shipped outside 
the state. Because the state had moved to dismiss the taxpayers' com-
plaint, it was assumed that the tax was exported along with the coal 
and that the tax bore no quantitative relationship to the value of serv-
ices provided by the state. Hence the fundamental issue was whether 
the commerce clause imposed any limits on the level of a state tax 
borne by out-of-state taxpayers. There was, to be sure, no discrimina-
tion, purposeful or otherwise, between local and out-of-state consum-
ers. Yet it was alleged that Montana had deliberately selected coal 
(remember the energy crisis?) "as the object of this extraordinary tax 
. . . to export the practical effect vf the tax to consumers in other 
states."24 One could thus argue, as I did some years ago, that 
the State's effective selection of a class of out-of-state taxpayers to shoul-
der a tax burden grossly in excess of any costs imposed directly or indi-
rectly by such taxpayers on the State places an unconstitutional burden 
upon interstate commerce. For the Court has made it clear that facially 
nondiscriminatory taxes which by their practical operation discriminate 
against interstate commerce are vulnerable to attack on Commerce 
Clause grounds. While the States need not fine-tune the exercise of their 
taxing power to accord with a precise accounting of the costs imposed by 
and benefits provided to the taxpayer, they should not be permitted to 
single out the nonresident taxpayer to bear the brunt of a demonstrable 
imbalance on this score, at least if it can be shown that other levies with 
a less selective impact do not suffer from such an imbalance.25 
Regan accurately observes that I have more recently shown myself 
to be "sympathetic ... [to] Montana's point of view"26 - sympathy 
acquired, no doubt, in the course of three years of litigating the case on 
behalf of the State of Montana.27 And he is right in intimating that I 
believe that Commonwealth Edison was correctly decided. My view, 
however, is based on the firm conviction that the Court is an institu-
tionally incapable and politically inappropriate body for determining 
the appropriate level of a tax. 28 I remain uncomfortable with the no-
tion that shifting the burden of the costs of state government to out-of-
23. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
24. Brief for Appellants at 8, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) 
(No. 80-581). 
25. Hellerstein, Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 
31 NATL. TAX J. 245, 249 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
26. Regan, supra note 6, at 1171. 
27. I have consistently disclosed this fact in writing about Commonwealth Edison, including 
the article cited by Regan. See McGrath & Hellerstein, Reflections on Commonwealth Edison 
Co. v. Montana, 43 MONT. L. REV. 165, 165 (1982). 
28. See Hellerstein, Constitutional Limitations on State Tax Exportation, 1982 AM. BAR 
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 54-59. 
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staters can never be regarded as purposeful economic protectionism so 
long as local economic actors are not favored over their out-of-state 
competitors. Even accepting Regan's view that citizens "as beneficial 
owners of the state's revenues ... do not compete with foreign con-
sumers,"29 I am not yet willing to abandon the principle that requir-
ing interstate commerce to pay more than its way discriminates 
against interstate commerce at least when intrastate commerce gener-
ally is not so burdened, even if there is no judicial remedy for that 
discrimination under the commerce clause. 
Another troublesome case that arguably involves both purposeful 
economic protectionism and cumulative tax burdens is Moorman 
Manufacturing Co. v. Bair. 30 In Moorman, the Court sustained the 
constitutionality of Iowa's single-factor sales formula for apportioning 
corporate income. The taxpayer manufactured and sold animal feeds. 
All of its products sold to Iowa customers were manufactured in Illi-
nois. The taxpayer sought to demonstrate that Iowa's single-factor 
formula for apportioning net income, when considered in conjunction 
with Illinois' three-factor formula of property, payroll, and sales, sub-
jected income derived from its Iowa sales to duplicative taxation in 
violation of the commerce clause.31 
Although the taxpayer had failed to prove that it had in fact been 
subjected to duplicative taxation, the Court proceeded to address the 
commerce clause questions raised by the two conflicting formulas on 
the assumption that they produced "some overlap"32 in the taxation of 
the taxpayer's income. The taxpayer had contended that "to the ex-
tent this overlap is permitted, the corporation that does business in 
more than one State shoulders a tax burden not shared by those oper-
ating entirely within a State."33 The Court responded that "[t]he only 
conceivable constitutional basis for invalidating the Iowa statute 
would be that the Commerce Clause prohibits any overlap in the com-
putation of taxable income by the States."34 But it noted that because 
29. Regan, supra note 6, at 1244. 
30. 437 U.S. 267 (1978). In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that I was of 
counsel to the Iowa Manufacturers Association, et al., which submitted a brief amici curiae 
supporting the state in Moorman. Needless to say, the views expressed here are entirely my own 
and do not necessarily - indeed, almost certainly do not - reflect the views of the Iowa Manu-
facturers Association, et al. 
31. The taxpayer also claimed that the formula resulted in extraterritorial taxation in viola-
tion of the due process clause, but the Court rejected this argument on the ground that the 
taxpayer had failed to prove that income attributed to Iowa was in fact earned in Illinois. 437 
U.S. at 271-75. 
32. 437 U.S. at 277. 
33. 437 U.S. at 277. 
34. 437 U.S. at 278. 
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the risk of such overlap may exist any time a multistate firm does busi-
ness in states having different division-of-income rules, a constitutional 
requirement of precisely apportioned income would have unacceptably 
broad consequences because it would require the Court to prescribe 
uniform rules of income attribution among the states. The Court con-
cluded that "the legislative power granted to Congress by the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of 
legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the divi-
sion of income,"35 and that such policy decisions should be made by 
the body to which they are constitutionally committed. In thus re-
jecting the taxpayer's invitation to forge the commerce clause into a 
tool for constitutionalizing division-of-income problems, the Court 
made it plain that, in this context, the cumulative-burden doctrine has 
a more limited role to play than once might have been envisioned. 
Regan has no difficulty with the Court's decision in Moorman, de-
spite its tolerance of cumulative tax burdens on the interstate firm 
''just because the firm is interstate":36 "Nonuniformity in methods 
that are perfectly fair considered individually can result in adventi-
tious burdening of interstate commerce. But this the Court has quite 
reasonably decided not to worry about. " 37 If Regan's premises are 
sound, I would have little quarrel with his conclusion. But are those 
premises sound? Even though the single-factor sales formula passes 
the test of "internal consistency" - i.e., if every state employed it, the 
interstate business would be taxed no more heavily than its intrastate 
competitor - it flunks the test of fairness. As the Court pointed out 
in General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 38 in striking down the 
District's single-factor sales formula on statutory grounds: 
While the Court has refrained from attempting to define any single ap-
propriate method of apportionment, it has sought to ensure that the 
methods used display a modicum of reasonable relation to corporate ac-
tivities within the State .... The standard three-factor formula can be 
justified as a rough, practical approximation of the distribution of either 
a corporation's sources of income or the social costs which it generates. 
By contrast, the geographic distribution of a corporation's sales is, by 
itself, of dubious significance in indicating the locus of either factor. 39 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the risk of cumulative bur-
dens created by Iowa's single-factor sales formula was truly "adventi-
tious." Even in 1965, the Court knew that 
35. 437 U.S. at 280. 
36. Regan, supra note 6, at 1187. 
37. Id. at 1186 n.180. 
38. 380 U.S. 553 (1965). 
39. 380 U.S. at 561. 
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[t]he great majority of States imposing corporate income taxes apportion 
the total income of a corporation by application of a three-factor formula 
which gives equal weight to the geographical distribution of plant, pay-
roll, and sales. The use of an apportionment formula based wholly on 
the sales factor, in the context of general use of the three-factor ap-
proach, will ordinarily result in multiple taxation of corporate net in-
come .... 40 
By 1978, forty-four out of the forty-five states other than Iowa that 
imposed corporate income taxes employed the three-factor formula.41 
If the Court can consider other states' laws or practices in the com-
merce clause calculus for determining the validity of state regulations 
of interstate transportation,42 which it apparently can do without ob-
jection from Regan, 43 why can it not do the same thing in the tax cases 
to protect interstate taxpayers from bearing heavier tax burdens than 
their intrastate competitors merely because the former engage in inter-
state commerce?44 
Finally, even if one believes that the Court has no business invali-
dating apportionment formulas under the commerce clause on the ba-
sis of their relative fairness, and that commerce clause decisions (at 
least in the tax field) should not turn on the current configuration of 
other states' legislation, there remains the question whether Iowa's 
statute amounted to purposeful economic protectionism. It is no se-
cret that Iowa is a market state. Insofar as out-of-state businesses are 
engaged in economic activity in Iowa it is likely to be through sales to 
Iowa customers. Moreover, insofar as local businesses are engaged in 
economic activity outside Iowa it is likely to be through sales to out-
of-state customers. Hence Iowa's adoption of a single-factor sales 
formula in the context of the general use of a three-factor formula by 
other states imposes a lower total income tax burden on Iowa-based 
businesses doing business in other states than on similarly situated out-
of-state businesses doing business in Iowa.45 The effect is to improve 
the economic position of the Iowa-based business over its foreign com-
petitor by minimizing the state tax burden of the former and maximiz-
ing the state tax burden of the latter. It takes no great feat of 
imagination to conjure up the legislative purpose underlying the Iowa 
statute, and it is a purpose that comes awfully close to Regan's defini-
40. 380 U.S. at 559 (footnote omitted). 
41. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 283 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
42. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Bibb v. Navajo 
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
43. See Regan, supra note 6, at 1182-85. 
44. See Moorman, 437 U.S. at 293-97 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
45. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 283-85 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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tion of purposeful economic protectionism. And while I am not pro-
posing that we resolve these cases on the basis of guilt by association, 
it is not without relevance that the Iowa Manufacturers Association 
filed an amicus brief supporting the validity of Iowa's single-factor 
sales formula. 46 
II 
In the course of sketching the broad outlines of his dormant com-
merce clause theory, with its admittedly "brief" and "oversimpli-
fied"47 treatment of the taxation area, Regan nevertheless makes 
several specific observations about the tax cases that warrant similarly 
specific comments: 
(1) Regan suggests that the "national interest in not subjecting 
interstate commerce to special disadvantage just because of its inter-
state character ... may account for the rule of Freeman v. Hewit that 
an interstate sale may not be taxed by the state of the seller."48 The 
"rule" of Freeman v. Hewit49 as articulated by the Court was that a 
"direct" tax on the proceeds from interstate sales violated the com-
merce clause wholly apart from any question of discrimination or cu-
mulative tax burdens. 50 That rule of absolute immunity of interstate 
commerce from state taxation was explicitly repudiated by the Court 
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 51 To be sure, one may recast 
the "rule" as an effort by the Court to prevent cumulative taxation in 
light of the presumed power of the state of the buyer to impose a tax 
on the interstate sale.52 Nevertheless, it remains unclear under the 
Court's contemporary commerce clause doctrine whether the Court 
would require the state of origin or the state of destination to yield, 
assuming both had nexus with the sale and each sought to tax it.53 It 
would seem that the Court would not permit both states to tax the 
transaction on an unapportioned basis, yet the Court "has expressly 
reserved the question whether a State must credit a sales tax paid to 
46. See note 30 supra. 
47. Regan, supra note 6, at 1185. 
48. Id. at 1187-88 (footnote omitted). 
49. 329 U.S. 249 (1946). 
SO. 329 U.S. at 254-57. 
51. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
52. Regan, supra note 6, at 1188; see also Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business 
and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. 
REV. 149, 172 (1976). 
53. The most perceptive judicial discussions of this problem appear in the separate opinions 
of Justice Rutledge in Freeman, 329 U.S. at 259-83 (concurring), and in International Harvester 
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349-62 (1944) (concurring and dissenting), 
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another State against its use tax."54 
(2) Regan recognizes that a compensating use tax could be part 
of a protectionist scheme "if, for example, a state that made furniture 
mainly out of oak imposed a sales tax and a compensating use tax only 
on furniture made out of maple."55 He goes on to note that "[h]ere, as 
elsewhere, purpose is the crucial question."56 Purpose is not, however, 
the only question raised by such a case. In Halliburton Oil Well Ce-
menting Co. v. Reily, 51 the Court examined the application of Louisi-
ana's use tax to specialized equipment purchased and assembled 
outside the state for use in the state. The focus of the controversy was 
the appropriate measure of the use tax as applied to a taxpayer who 
purchased and assembled equipment outside the state. The statute de-
fined the measure of the tax as the full value of equipment purchased 
outside the state, including the value of the taxpayer's labor and over-
head attributable to its out-of-state assembly. Had the taxpayer 
purchased and assembled this equipment in Louisiana, it would have 
been subject to a sales tax measured only by the cost of the articles 
purchased, without inclusion of the labor costs or overhead. 
It is difficult to believe that the discrimination against out-of-state 
assemblers of equipment was purposeful. In Louisiana, as elsewhere, 
the sales tax base has generally been limited to sales of tangible per-
sonal property. Unless the sales tax statute specifically so provides, 
sales of services have not been taxable. The use tax base is generally 
defined in terms of the "cost price" of the item used in the state, which 
ordinarily would be equivalent to the sales price of the item if sold at 
retail in the taxing state. In cases in which a final product is 
purchased at retail, these definitions will give rise to no inequality be-
tween in-state and out-of-state purchases, because the tax bases will be 
identical. Hence, in all but a handful of cases, Louisiana's taxing 
scheme would work without constitutional hitch because the out-of-
state purchaser would be saddled with a use tax in Louisiana on the 
out-of-state purchase identical to the sales tax he would have paid in 
Louisiana had he purchased the item there. The problem in Hallibur-
ton was that the scheme did not work for the peculiar case of the out-
of-state self-assembler of property brought into Louisiana. The Court 
quite properly struck down the tax because it discriminated against 
the out-of-state purchaser-assembler as compared with its in-state 
counterpart. Purpose, however, was irrelevant. Indeed, the Court de-
54. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1985). 
55. Regan, supra note 6, at 1256. 
56. Id. 
57. 373 U.S. 64 (1963). 
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clared that "[w]hile the inequality in question may have been an acci-
dent of statutory drafting, it does in fact strike at a significant segment 
of economic activity and carries economic effects of a type proscribed 
by many previous cases."58 
Halliburton is nevertheless quite consistent with Regan's broad 
commerce clause theory. The case can easily be explained as one that 
placed the interstate business at a competitive disadvantage merely be-
cause it was interstate. 
(3) Regan poses the question whether, in the absence of a local 
sales tax, a state could "adopt a use tax applicable only to imported 
goods and ... defend the use tax on the ground that local retailers pay 
higher property taxes than foreign retailers, or that foreign retailers 
pay lower payroll taxes than their local counterparts."59 Regan's an-
swer is negative, and he suspects that the Court's would be also, 
although he acknowledges that "[t]he Court's view on 'equalizing' 
taxes may be more generous than mine."60 In fact, the Court has 
struggled for years with "complementary" or "compensatory" taxes 
that are offered by the states as a defense to taxes that appear to dis-
criminate against interstate commerce.6 I Recently the Court has 
taken a narrow view of the complementary tax doctrine, 62 suggesting 
that Regan's negative answer would be shared by the Court. Never-
theless, in light of the Court's precedents sustaining as "complemen-
tary" taxes whose relationship to one another has been unsettlingly 
loose, 63 the precise contours of the doctrine remain uncertain. 
( 4) I should finally address the case where my differences with 
Regan seem greatest. Regan takes me to task for suggesting that the 
decision in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 64 which sustained the consti-
tutionality of a compensating use tax scheme, countenanced a form of 
protectionism by interfering with interstate tax competition. 65 In the 
article that Regan cites, 66 I had relied in turn on Professor Ernest 
Brown, who had inquired: 
58. 373 U.S. at 72. 
59. Regan, supra note 6, at 1257. 
60. Id. 
61. See generally Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State 
Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405 (1986). 
62. See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U.S. 725, 758-60 (1981). 
63. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1961); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1958). 
64. 300 U.S. 577 (1937). 
65. Regan, supra note 6, at 1252-55. 
66. Hellerstein, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, in 2 COURTS 
AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 431, 461-62 (T. 
February 1987] Co"espondence 769 
Should one state in a federal system be able to raise its price levels, iso-
late itself and protect its markets from the outside price competition 
thereby stimulated? Or does the federal system demand at least that de-
gree of economic unity which would require that consumers and buyers 
within the state have some measure of access to a free market outside?67 
To Regan's charge that my views were ill-conceived, I can only 
plead nolo contendere, a plea I had actually entered in print, although 
admittedly without formally recanting my earlier views: 
Insofar as a use tax simply assures that a tax is paid on all consumption, 
whether from in-state or out-of-state producers, such a tax is not "pro-
tective" as that term is generally understood. A protective tariff is tradi-
tionally viewed as a levy that singles out the foreign product for taxation 
to which the local good is not subjected in order to protect the local good 
from foreign competition .... [R]aising domestic price levels is not gen-
erally regarded as protectionism. Moreover, Professor Brown's assump-
tion that a state with a broad-based consumption tax can isolate itself 
and protect its market from outside competition is ill-founded because 
in-state producers are given no artificial tax advantage by a use tax that 
merely mirrors a sales tax, and higher in-state prices will discourage in-
state purchases by residents of other states. . . . Professor Brown's con-
cerns are rooted in the notion that the federal system gives consumers in 
states with consumption taxes the right to escape such taxes by purchas-
ing goods in states without consumption taxes. Although this might cor-
respond to Professor Brown's view of "access to a free market," it is at 
odds with the Court's modern commerce clause opinions that have repu-
diated the idea that the commerce clause creates a tax free zone of im-
munity for interstate commerce.68 
Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1982). Regan also cites my comments in the symposium discussion in 
REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 125 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981). 
67. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 
YALE L.J. 219, 234 (1957). 
68. Hellerstein, supra note 61, at 409 n.24. 
